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The trend is for SALW control (and DDR) programmes to become more integrated into national socio-economic 
development, therefore programme evaluation and the use of performance indicators are important to; 1) 
monitor the impact of a programme during its implementation; 2) provide management information during the 
implementation of a project; 3) verify that the programme is making progress towards achieving its objectives; 
and 4) to satisfy donors, governments and other stakeholders.  
There is growing acceptance within the donor community that the evaluation of all development projects, 
irrespective of activity group, should be conducted, (whenever possible), using objective, quantitative analysis 
based on the internationally recognised principles of the development community.  Yet, little formal work on PI 
for SALW control interventions has been done to date and they are rarely included in SALW project documents.1 
Evaluation, in the absence of PI, tends by its nature to be subjective; objective, quantitative evaluation requires 
the development of specific PI.  Conversely, most statistics will need subjective interpretation to come alive and 
take on meaning, especially for donors whose home-based analysts sometimes have no personal knowledge of 
the country.  The art of judging, assessing or explaining programme performance should also combine relevant 
and appropriate PI with subjective and illustrative anecdotes.
Data capture for some PI will of course remain a challenge, but it is one 
that must be addressed if the information provided by the PI is to be 
useful to programme managers, programme directors and donors.  The 
decision as to which PI to use, and how much external dissemination to 
allow, will of course be up to the judgement of the programme manager, 
and must be agreed with the national authorities.  Many elements of 
SALW programmes are considered integral to issues of national security 
by the government. Even the exact nature of police policy in relation to 
security is closely guarded and often beyond the access of an external 
programme.2  Information received, like all statistics, can be misused or 
misdirected to the detriment, or even the covert benefit, of a programme, 
but that does not negate the very real need to capture and analyse the 
data required for the PI.  This information should be obtained throughout 
a programme life as it can also be used to support informed management 
decisions necessary to respond to a changing situation on the ground. 
Some of the PI will inevitably produce controversial statistics, and it is 
important that close cooperation with the national SALW authority is 
maintained and that the national policy on external dissemination is 
adhered to.3  The capacity of the national SALW authority will be key to 
the collection and analysis of data and hence the effectiveness of PI, and 
where such an authority is weak or non-existent, capacity development 
in this particular area may be necessary at both the local and national 
levels, involving a wide range of stakeholders.
This paper examines the concept of performance indicators, their applicability to SALW control programmes 
and the impact they can have on the successful management of such programmes.  Recommendations are 
also made for the development of an objective and analytically based evaluation methodology for SALW control 
programmes.
1 The only referenced work identified is:
q Safe and Efficient SALW Collection and Destruction Programmes - Proposal for Practical Technical Measures, Hughes-Wilson J and Wilkinson A E A, UNDP, 
July 2001.
q Development Held Hostage - Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, Batchelor P and Muggah R, UNDP and Small Arms Survey, April 
2002.
2 EU ASAC input of October 2004.  (David de Beer).
3 This policy should form part of the national SALW control strategy, and arrangements made for the use of PI to support the SALW awareness 
campaign where appropriate.  The ‘old barriers of secrecy’ must be broken down.
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The work of Muggah and Batchelor proposes that ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ indicators could measure the 
impact of SALW on development.   ‘Primary’ indicators being normally short-term and quantitative, relating to 
the availability and misuse of SALW, whilst ‘secondary’ indicators are usually longer term and more qualitative. 
The immediate requirement of SALW control interventions is to obtain management information to support 
programme planning and then illustrate success and impact to donors on an annual funding cycle; therefore 
‘primary’ indicators are generally the more immediate concern to programme managers.  This paper therefore 
concentrates on primary quantitative PI, but accepts the importance of the longer-term qualitative secondary PI. 
Secondary PI should be designed and developed to link into the wider Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda.  
Caution must be the key word though in any use of 
primary PI as reliance on them alone will not have any 
value unless the relationship between the primary 
PI themselves, and their impact on secondary PI is 
examined at some stage during the process.  For 
example, the collection of SALW in Mozambique would 
have been considered a success if a collection PI had 
been solely used to indicate success or failure, yet 
the weapons were not destroyed and subsequently 
appeared in the South African underworld.  In this case 
the use of a collection PI, without a complementary 
destruction PI would have indicated a ‘success’, when 
in reality it was arguably an ineffective intervention 
when other related factors are considered.4
Primary PI are important for monitoring during the 
implementation of a programme in terms of identifying 
trends, and suggesting areas for corrective managerial 
action.  They must, however, be linked to longer term secondary PI that are relevant to the political, economic, 
security and social impact that a SALW intervention has on local, national and even regional communities.  SALW 
intervention programmes can be both a conflict prevention and post-conflict activity, and it is important that their 
final impact on the peace building objectives are assessed.  Primary PI can, and should, be used to support such 
an assessment, but they should not be the only information used in such an assessment, as it is likely that the 
wrong lessons will be learned.
There will be a temptation to report to donors using primary PI, in order to access funding and resources for the 
next years’ phase of the project.  This is unfortunately a reality of project management when resource mobilization 
is reliant on annual donor funding cycles.  Should single PI be used as a donor reporting mechanism, then the 
inherent dangers of reliance on such a system for assessing programme progress should be clearly identified to 
the donor, and reference made to the longer term use of secondary PI importance in terms of assessing the full 
impact of a SALW control intervention on a community or society.  
 Primary versus Secondary Indicators
4 Robin Poulton, E Mail to author, 04 October 2004.
Picture 2:  SALW Collection during the Afghan New 
Beginnings Programme (ANBP) 2003
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n Initial data must be collected during SALW Survey, or soon after, so that progress can be as accurately 
identified as possible.5
n Operational objectives for SALW control interventions must be SMART; 1) Stated; 2) Measurable; 
3) Achievable; 4) Realistic; and 5) Time constrained. 
n The widest possible range of PI should be agreed and adopted.
n Monitoring and evaluation techniques, and the financial resources to support them, must be included as a 
component of the project document.
n The PI must be included as a component of the Project Document.
n Part of the project may be to enhance the capacity of national data collection and analysis systems in order 
that information is available to feed into the various PI mathematical models. 
n The ground security environment and literacy levels of the population will be key factors in determining the 
most appropriate PI to consider. ‘Statistical western style marketing surveys cannot be done with reasonable 
accuracy in disparate, illiterate communities under war conditions‘.6  Notwithstanding these problems, it is 
possible to use appropriate PI in such conditions, although a caveat should again be used when such data is 
released.
n All stakeholders should agree on the appropriate PI before the commencement of a programme.  This 
means that they have all then agreed on their objectives for the programme, increases their motivation for 
participation and strengthens stakeholder ownership of the process.  Different stakeholder aspirations may 
well mean using different PI for what appear to be very similar programmes.
5 This is critical to the effectiveness of PI, as baseline data is so important.  It would be difficult to inject a PI system into a project at the half 
way stage, as comparisons would be extremely difficult.  At this stage perceptions of an improved security environment are perhaps more 
relevant that ‘pure’ PI systems.  (Input from EU ASAC, October 2004).
6 David de Beer, E Mail to author, October 2004.
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Although quantitative PI should not be the only measure of programme performance, they do provide important 
indicators as to success or failure.  This part of the paper provides more detail on the proposed PI, and provides 
examples from recent SALW control interventions within SEE.14  Performance Indicators need to be adapted to 
the special circumstances of each case.  A single, best, generic PI methodology does not exist, but it is possible 
to provide a range of PI for consideration.  Credible evaluations intermix quantitative and qualitative data from a 
variety of sources in order to reach final conclusions; quantitative PI are a significant part of this process.
SALW Recovery Statistics
n Collection Statistics
The number of weapons recovered (by type) is compared against the estimated number of weapons present in 
the local community, based on SALW Survey results:
   Quantity of Weapons Recovered  
 Estimated Weapons in Community
This PI considers the least number of variables, but is only as accurate as the estimate of the physical number 
of weapons present in the target community from the SALW Survey   Other factors, such as the illegal inflow or 
outflow of weapons in the target community during the collection phase will also impact on the accuracy of this 
approach.  It is very difficult, although not impossible to monitor illegal activities within communities, and there 
will be a significant margin of error in this PI.  Yet it can look at the effectiveness of an intervention in terms of 
‘order of magnitude’; for example it is useful to know whether the distribution of weapons is in the 10,000s, 
100,000s or 1,000,000s.
NOTE It is important that the number of collected weapons is NOT used solely as the measure of success 
or failure of a SALW control intervention.  It MUST always be emphasised that the number of 
weapons collected are only one component of a series of coordinated and integrated activities, 
which together aim to reduce the proliferation and IMPACT of weapons within a community.  SALW 
control is NOT just about weapons collection; improved perceptions of human security, improved 
social and economic conditions and the registration and management of weapons are all highly 
desirable outcomes.  These do not necessarily require weapons collection!
 Quantitative Performance Indicators
Weapons Recovered (%) = x  100
Picture 3:  SALW Collection in Macedonia 
during 2003 produces some surprises.  A 
Main Battle Tank (T-55) was surrendered 
by one community.
14 The majority of Case Studies are from the 2003 SACIM project as this is the only one where the appropriate data was collected to enable 
the use of PI.
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CASE STUDY
During the 2003 Macedonia SALW amnesty a total of 7,551 weapons were 
recovered in response to the SACIM Weapons in Exchange for Incentives 
(WEI) incentive component.  The 2003 SALW Survey estimated that a total 
of between 100,000 and 450,000 illegal weapons in circulation.  This PI, 
(using a mid point estimate), therefore indicates that the amnesty collected 
2.7% of the illegal weapons in circulation.  Although low as percentages, 
this amnesty collected more weapons than the previous national amnesty 
and the 2001 NATO intervention combined; judged against that it was 
a more successful intervention.  In this example the PI could be used to 
demonstrate that the intervention had collected approximately 151% more 
weapons (7551 v 3000) than the 2001 NATO SALW control intervention at 
a fraction of the costs.  The improved, but difficult to measure, attitudes 
of society towards weapons ownership and the fact that illegal weapons 
were driven deeper underground are all important successful results of this 
particular intervention.
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n SALW Registration Statistics
The increase in weapon registration during the period of the SALW control intervention can be used as a PI:
Total Registrations  – Registrations (Prior)
Registration (Prior)
n Cost per Recovered Weapon
A more complicated approach is to compare the “cost” of recovering a weapon to the programme against the 
street price. The total costs of the collection component of the programme  (operating costs and incentive 
options 15 costs), divided by the number of weapons recovered gives an initial crude indicator of what it has cost to 
recover each individual weapon.  This is still a highly emotive issue within the SALW community. Regardless of the 
pros and cons of the overall argument, it is a harsh reality that the media, and other international organizations 
still look at the ‘cost’ of recovering a weapon as THEIR indicator of success or failure. This is mainly because it 
is easy to do, easy to understand and allows for sensational media coverage.  If the cost per weapon recovered 
is less than the ‘street price’ then that provides one means of defending against such coverage, and certainly 
proves that a more effective approach than just ‘buy back’ has been achieved.  
Total Cost of Programme ($)
Total Weapons Recovered 
This PI will only be of value once the collection phase has reached a degree of maturity, as the first weapon 
collected will of course be very expensive.  The Cost per Recovered Weapon will begin to fall as more are recovered, 
but will increase as more finance is committed to funding the incentive option selected.  The cost per recovered 
weapon will also begin to increase as it becomes more difficult to maintain voluntary surrender levels during the 
collection process.  Therefore this PI should not be used as a management decision making tool until programme 
maturity, but the data should be loaded into the financial model throughout the programme.  It will soon become 
apparent when this PI becomes an effective measure of success.
The approach can be made more sophisticated by comparing individual weapons against total costs.  The 
mathematical model for this is complex with a number of variables and involves the management team in the 
continual substitution of figures in a spreadsheet model.  The street price for a pistol will be different to that 
for an assault rifle, therefore the PI model should also reflect this.  If the difference is 40%, then the cost per 
recovered weapon should also vary by an equivalent percentage.  The figures in the spreadsheet model should 
be continually altered to reflect this equivalent percentage.  There can also be significant differences in prices 
between urban, rural, remote or border areas and they are also dependent on political and social factors. In 
conclusion, this seemingly simple PI is in fact very complex and great care should be taken if is it selected.
The danger with both the simple and more sophisticated approaches, is that it could give the impression that the 
programme is in essence a “buy back” programme by another aim, and that there is a direct linkage between the costs 
of the incentive option component selected and the number of weapons that have been voluntarily surrendered.  
% Increase in Weapon Registration  = x  100
15 Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED), Weapons in Exchange for Incentives (WEI), Weapons in Competition for Development (WCD), 
Weapons Linked to Development (WLD), ‘Search and Seize’ etc.
Cost per Recovered Weapon ($)  =
CASE STUDY
During the Kosovo ISAC Project in 2003 a total of approximately 23,000 illegal weapons were registered, in addition to 
the approximate 9,000 weapons already registered.  Using this PI shows that the ISAC project achieved a % Increase of 
Weapons Registration of 255%.
CASE STUDY
During the 2003 Macedonia SALW amnesty a total of 7,551 weapons were recovered in response to a Weapons in 
Exchange for Incentives (WEI) incentive component.  The costs to the UNDP SACIM project of this phase of the SACIM 
project, (including the SALW Awareness component) were approximately USD 400,000, which resulted in a Cost per 
Recovered Weapon of USD $53.  The street price for an AK variant assault rifle at the time was in the order of USD $150.
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The technical limitations of this approach are that it doesn’t reflect the intent of individuals in the target 
community to use any weapons they may have or take account of the “value” of recovered ammunition.   In 
terms of ammunition value, this is not a major failing.  Most recovered ammunition would be useless without the 
weapons; and if ammunition that can be regarded as a “self contained” weapon (such as hand grenades and 
certain Rocket Launchers) is included in the model, then the validity of the approach will be enhanced.
Crime and Suicide Statistics
n Fatalities, Injuries and Armed Robbery
One indication of the impact of a SALW control programme on a target community is a comparison of the crime 
statistics in the area prior to, during and after completion of the weapons collection phase.  Statistics should be 
kept for; 1) fatalities using weapons; 2) woundings as a result of weapons; 3) aggravated assault; and 4) armed 
robbery.  These can again be reported in percentage terms:
(1   -   Current Crime Figures  )
      Previous Crime Figures
This PI provides a realistic indication of the impact of a collection programme on the target community, but is 
limited in that it does not give an indication of any intent of individuals in the community to use any weapons they 
may have in the future.  It does not, however, provide an indicator as to the root causes of armed violence and 
crime.  A SALW control intervention programme cannot begin to address the root causes of violence in isolation, 
and will form part of a much larger process.  This is a developing area outside the scope of this paper.
n Risk Rating
This PI allocates a risk rating to each individual weapon type based on previous and current weapon usage in the 
area:      Total Number of Fatalities
Total Weapons used in Attacks
Total Number of Injuries
Total Weapons used in Attacks
These Risk Ratings can be established for both the target community and the country as a whole.  They should 
also be monitored for any rise or fall in the Risk Rating as this will provide a general indication of intentions of the 
weapon user, and to a degree, the level of competence of illegal users.  The usefulness of a Risk Rating is that 
it can suggest to the programme management team whether or not there is a need to ‘target’ specific weapon 
types because the use of such weapons would inevitably produce many more casualties than other weapons 
types.  This is one major argument behind the current US policy of ‘buy back’ for Man-Portable Air Defence 
Systems (MANPADS), due to the devastation than a successful illegal MANPAD attack against a civil aircraft 
would have.
16 Hungary is used as a comparator as it is close to SEE, but has a more stringent national SALW control policy and is further towards euro-
atlantic integration.
Percentage Change (%)  = x  100
Picture 4:  SALW Survey 
of Montenegro 2004
Risk Rating (Fatality)  =
Risk Rating (Injury)  =
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CASE STUDY
The SALW Survey of Montenegro identified that the homicide rate using small arms was 
3 per 100,000 population.  This compares to a rate of 1.28 per 100,000 population for 
Macedonia.  (Rate for Hungary16 is 0.45 per 100,000 population).
CASE STUDY
The SALW Survey of Montenegro identified that 33% of suicides in one region were committed 
with small arms. This compares to rates of 59% for Albania and 10% for Macedonia.   (Rate 
for Hungary is 3%).
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n Violation Prosecutions
Statistics should be maintained on the number of unsuccessful and successful legal prosecutions17 for the 
illegal use, carriage and possession of weapons within a target community.  The % increase or decrease should 
be calculated.
Economic Statistics
n Street Price
Simple supply and demand laws would suggest that the success of a SALW control programme could be measured 
by an analysis of the street price18 of weapons in the target community and the adjoining regions. 
(1   -   Current Street Price  )
      Previous Street Price
An increase in the street price would indicate an increasing scarcity of available weapons. This increasing scarcity 
or an increase in demand is either being caused by the impact of the collection phase or by an outflow of weapons 
from the community into adjoining regions, (where a better price can be obtained for the dealer).  Either way, it is 
an indicator that weapons are being removed from the target community, although it is difficult to know whether 
or not the problem is just been shifted elsewhere.  Conversely a fall in the street price can also reflect a drop in 
the demand for weapons because of improved legislation, implementation of legislation or an improvement in 
perceptions of human security; all of which could have been impacted by the SALW control intervention.  Again, 
like in other PI areas, care must be taken to make sure that the correct conclusions are drawn from this particular PI.
n Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) 20
The DALY has emerged as a measure of the burden of disease, (or in this case injury), and it reflects the total 
amount of healthy life lost to all causes during a period of time.  Further information is available from the WHO 
17 Statistics on unsuccessful prosecutions should also be kept as these may also prove to be one indicator as to the effectiveness of the 
judicial system.
18 Within SEE a range of organizations have been used to try and maintain an overview of the street price of weapons within communities. 
This is a highly sensitive area, which must be treated with the strictest confidentiality.  It would not be desirable for illegal weapons traders to 
be able to easily find out where the prices are most advantageous to them as this could trigger illegal movement of weapons.
19 If this percentage change is negative, it indicates an INCREASE in the Street Price
20 Source - Development Held Hostage - Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, Batchelor P and Muggah R, UNDP 
and Small Arms Survey, April 2002.
Picture 5:  SALW collection 
process in Albania 2002.
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Percentage Change (%)19  = x  100
Picture 6:  SALW 
collected in Albania 
during 2002.
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CASE STUDY
This PI was covertly used during the 1999 Gramsh Pilot Project in Albania.  During that 
period, for an AK variant assault rifle there were 21 fatalities for every 100 times that 
particular type of weapon was used.  Hence a Risk Rating of 0.21 evolved.  In the case 
of an RPG 7 the Risk Rating was as high as 0.80.  Unfortunately the programme did not 
maintain these statistics post-1999 and it is not possible to assess whether the follow-on 
SALW project in Albania had a positive impact on the Risk Rating.
CASE STUDY
In Albania during 1997/1998 the street price for an AK variant assault rifle was in the region of 
USD$ 40, after the UNDP supported interventions from 1998 to 2002 the street price rose to 
approximately USD$ 120, an increase of 200%.  This was due to a number of supply related factors 
including 1) the outflow of 200,000 weapons to neighbouring countries; 2) market saturation 
meaning individuals didn’t bother to try and sell; and 3) impact of police and legislation driving 
weapons underground.  The UNDP intervention cannot claim all of the credit for the impact on the 
street price, although it certainly made a significant contribution. Increased street prices means 
weapons become more unaffordable, and therefore more difficult to obtain for random acts of 
armed violence.
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on the mechanisms for this particular PI.   A DALY would provide the most comprehensive description of the costs 
associated with armed violence in terms of human capital, but it is also impacted by significant improvements 
in the health system during the SALW programme life.  A relationship in economic terms can then be draw by 
applying a median income. 
(DALY by Armed Violence)  X  (Median Income Wage)
This figure represents the wages lost as a result of armed violence. The effects of armed violence prematurely 
rob the economy of productive workers.  This equation highlights the economic loss caused to society by the use 
of small arms.
n Years of Potential Life Lost (YPLL) 21
The YPLL has emerged as a measure of premature mortality and is derived by summing years of life lost over all 
age groups.  Further information is available from the WHO on the mechanisms for this particular PI. 
n Storage Costs v Destruction Costs for Surplus SALW
SEESAC is soon to start a project to provide a model to assess the costs of security and storage compared to 
the costs of destruction for weapons.  Although not a ‘true’ PI, this information is useful in terms of advocacy to 
persuade governments to destroy surplus stocks of weapons and ammunition.
n % Funding against Functional Area
This PI requires further work in terms of trying to assess as to what proportion of project funding should be 
allocated to each functional area of a SALW control intervention.  For example, would an increase in 20% to 
40% of project funding to SALW awareness result in a proportional increase in risk and impact awareness within 
communities.
n Trends in local investment, foreign direct investment   
 (FDI) and economic/humanitarian aid requirements
These statistics are usually available from the World Bank or Ministry of Finance.  Any improvement in internal 
investment, FDI or reduction in aid requirements can not be directly attributed to the SALW control intervention 
21 Source - Development Held Hostage - Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, Batchelor P and Muggah R, UNDP 
and Small Arms Survey, April 2002.
Picture 7:  SALW Awareness in 
Macedonia, 2003.
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CASE STUDY
In Colombia, between 1989 and the late 1990s, 20% of all DALY were attributed to SALW.  In 1995 a total of 1,450, 845 
years of potential life were lost - over 60% of which were directly attributable to small arms.
CASE STUDY
It has been identified that in the USA during 1998 the cost per firearms injury was over USD $14,000. (Sources: Batchelor 
and Muggah, from May and Rice, 1993).
CASE STUDY
IIn the 2003 SACIM project in Macedonia, USD$290,000 of a USD $600,000 
budget (48%), was specifically committed to SALW awareness.  The campaign 
was objectively assessed as being highly successful, with an increase of risk and 
impact awareness of 80% after the campaign.  Yet, for future projects it would be 
useful to know whether this is the sort of percentage that should be committed to 
awareness, and whether there is an optimum percentage funding range, (25 - 40% 
for example).
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as so many other variables all contribute to these areas.  Yet it is possible to argue that without an intervention 
then the environment necessary for investment may not have been stimulated.  Undoubtedly an effective SALW 
control intervention can improve the perception and reality of human security to a situation whereby there is an 
improvement in the confidence of the investment communities.  Therefore it is legitimate to look at this sort of PI, 
although great caution must be exercised in assessing the actual impact that the SALW control intervention may 
have had on improvements in these areas.
NOTE The government’s approach to poverty alleviation has a direct 
effect on levels of violence in communities.  Poor communities 
are likely to be more violent. 22
Legal Use Statistics
n Military and Police weapons and ammunition accidents
This statistic indicates the level of competence and training received by security agencies in the storage, transport 
and use of weapons and ammunition.  Improved training levels, and an increased ethos in the minimal use of 
force, should result in this figure declining.  Should it increase, then reasons should be identified and corrective 
measure implemented.
n Number of time used by security agencies – incidents, rounds fired, casualties
Statistics could be maintained on the operational usage of weapons by national security agencies.  A decrease 
in usage could be compared against the statistics for crime using weapons to try and identify any correlation.   In 
many countries it may be difficult to access the data for this PI.
SALW Awareness
One of the primary aims of a SALW Awareness campaign is to change the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of 
the target audience, which can also include the security forces themselves.23  Whilst behaviour change can be 
measured, to a degree, from the crime and armed violence statistics, it is still important that changing attitudes 
and knowledge is assessed.  A confirmatory ‘survey’ should be conducted during and at the end of a SALW 
awareness campaign to provide indicators of such changes.
n Improvement in Risk and Impact Awareness
Picture 8:  SALW recovered from 
a weapons cache in Cambodia.
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22 Comment by David de Beer, EU ASAC, October 2004.
23 The EU ASAC project specifically tries to positively impact on the SALW awareness of the police and army.
CASE STUDY
The UNDP SALW Control in Macedonia (SACIM) conducted a ‘mini-survey’ on the conclusion of the national weapons 
amnesty in late 2003.  This indicated that their SALW Awareness campaign had reached over 90% of households within 
the country, and produced an estimated increase in awareness of the SALW issue within Macedonia by over 80%.
CASE STUDY
In Albania, following the collapse of the pyramid schemes in 1997 and the outbreaks of related violence, net inflows of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) declined almost 36% in 3 years; (from USD $70M in 1995 to USD $45 in 1998).  Yet 
the External Aid per capita increased by 29% over the same period; (from USD $56 to USD $72).
CASE STUDY
The EU ASAC project in Cambodia had a significant success in Snuol where there was 
extensive armed violence throughout the district prior to their intervention.  The EU 
ASAC intervention mobilised, among others, the political and economic communities 
to a stage whereby there violence reduced and investment was stimulated.
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Introduction
SALW control programmes are often highly visible, and can also be controversial.   As such, there will be demands 
from a variety of quarters for an assessment of the programme value in economic, social and security terms.  In 
addition, many lessons can be learnt from the formal evaluation of SALW control programmes.   Such programmes 
are invariably complicated and each individual programme is to a greater or lesser extent different to others in 
terms of the political, social and security impacts on the community; yet there are also many commonalities in 
terms of programme management, technical procedures and the types of incentive options.   Evaluation can 
be done at many points - shortly after commencement of the collection process, in mid-term and at the end. 
There are also times when programmes seem to be making little progress, or are delayed for a complex series of 
reasons.  It is at such times that an independent external evaluation can clarify the situation, and assistance can 
be provided to the programme management team.
An evaluation of programme process must be undertaken to document the results, provide information to the 
host nation, donors and interested international organisations.  It should, as a minimum, provide a description of 
the process, account for funds dispersed, assess to what extent the programme objectives have been met and 
identify lessons learned for the future.   Ideally the evaluation criteria should be determined at the programme 
planning stage, but it must also take into account any unexpected programme impacts.
Evaluation should be an asset for those being evaluated.  It is an opportunity for them to learn and to reconcile 
different perspectives. This very positive quality of evaluation is something that should be explained clearly to all 
participants in order to create a sense of ownership and commitment. Fundamentally, evaluation is intended to 
improve project planning and delivery; it contributes to decision-making and strategy formulation.  Too often the 
evaluator sees their role as a critic rather than as a programme support tool.  The UN and donors should demand 
the ‘support and reorientation’ function rather than the critical and negative aspect of evaluation.25  
In other humanitarian aid sectors evaluation support is often provided by consultants on an ad-hoc basis. 
Understandably different consultants have approached the process of evaluation from different standpoints, 
based on their previous experience.  The problem in the SALW field is that it is so new that there are not many 
consultants with any practical operational experience.  In addition to this, there is no formal evaluation process 
specifically tailored for SALW control programmes.  There is a danger that evaluations will be purely subjective and 
contain individual bias.  The development and use of the performance indicators proposed earlier would greatly 
assist in quantitative, objective evaluations, but they cannot cover all aspects of a programme.  Evaluations 
should aim to provide high quality, objectively based information in order to improve programme efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness.
Evaluation planning should be incorporated into the original project design documents.  Not only will such an 
approach anticipate the key issues to be examined in future monitoring and evaluation work, it will also enhance 
the project’s design, and encourage an analysis of assumptions and risks involved in project delivery.
Whilst it would be ideal to establish a single body to carry out all evaluations of SALW programme evaluations, this 
is clearly impracticable.  However, it should be possible to evolve principles and a standard format and structure 
for evaluation, including guidelines on the areas to be evaluated and some advice on the evaluation methods to be 
used.  Since every evaluation will be different, such standard formats, structures and guidelines would have to be 
flexible, but it is considered that a basic structure could probably be applied to bring a discipline and consistency 
to evaluation reports.  If approved by agencies calling for evaluations, these basic structures could be used for 
the tasking and de-briefing of evaluation personnel, and as a guide for the formal evaluation reports.  Comparison 
24 An evaluation is defined by ISO as “a process that attempts to determine as systematically and objectively as possible the merit or value of 
an intervention”.  The word ”objectively” indicates the need to achieve a balanced analysis, recognising bias and reconciling perspectives of 
different stakeholders through use of different sources and methods.   Evaluation must be considered to be a strategic exercise.  ISO 11011 
- Auditing of Quality Management Systems
25 Robin Poulton, E Mail to author, 04 October 2004.
 Programme Evaluation 24
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between lessons learned during programmes, and their 
potential impact on the development of SALW control 
theory and practice, would be significantly improved if 
the international community adopted similar evaluation 
methodology and report structures.  The development 
of programme evaluation is a complex issue26 requiring 
expert advice in the formulation of an appropriate 
methodology; therefore it will not be covered in detail in 
this discussion paper. What will be covered are the issues 
and areas to be examined. In addition the objectives 
for a study to develop programme evaluation will be 
proposed.
What is Evaluation?
The term refers basically to:
“…an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an on-going or completed project, programme or 
policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, 
developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information 
that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of 
both recipients and donors”.27
The definition of evaluation stresses the need for objectivity, the possibility of assessing a project/programme/
policy during implementation or after implementation, and the need to look at all stages of a project cycle from 
design - to implementation - to final results, in order to capture a complete set of lessons learned.28
Evaluation is an indispensable ingredient of the overall project cycle. Whether it takes place mid-way through a 
project, at the end of a project, or years after the project has been completed, evaluation provides information that 
can enhance future planning, or indicate adjustments to implementation that need to be made. The relationship 
is depicted in the following graph.
Programme Evaluation Study 
If it is agreed that the SALW community desires consistency in programme evaluation, then the following objectives 
should be addressed:
n Investigate the need for the evaluation of SALW control programmes.
n Examine current evaluation techniques29, both in relation to SALW and other disciplines.
n Investigate and develop an objective and quantitative SALW control programme evaluation structure based 
on statistical analysis and internationally recognised audit procedures.30
n Derive from the above an optimised evaluation technique and series of evaluation methods to provide 
consistent and comparable evaluation reports.
n Field-test the new technique on a suitable small-scale programme.
n If approved, disseminate the new evaluation technique to the widest range of stakeholders.
26 Indeed, after 12 years the international mine action community is only just addressing this issue, and they are more developed in 
operational methodology, international standards and programme comparison than the SALW community.
27 Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD, DAC, 1991, Para 5
28 Evaluation does not take place before a project, but only after a project has commenced. The term “appraisal” is normally reserved for the 
investigative activities involved in the planning process before the start of a project.
29 See UNDP Handbook - Results Orientated Monitoring and Evaluation, New York, 1999.
30 ISO 11011 - Auditing of Quality Management Systems would be a good place to start.
Evaluation
Planning
Implementation
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Programme Evaluation Areas
The detailed requirements for programme evaluation 
should be considered by the recommended study, 
however the following areas should be addressed:
n An audit of donor funds is essential in line with the 
principles of control and transparency.
n An examination of the accuracy and effectiveness 
of the weapon and ammunition accounting procedures.
n A detailed description of the programme background and the implementation of all aspects of the programme. 
This should include SALW survey, SALW awareness, collection, destruction and the progress of any related 
projects.31
n Verification of the final disposal route for recovered weapons and ammunition.
n An analysis of the programme’s progress towards meeting the pre-determined programme output objectives.
n An indication of the motives of the affected community in surrendering their weapons and ammunition.
n The impact of the programme on the political, social and economic environments.
n Lessons learned.
CASE STUDY
The UNIDIR ‘Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) of Weapons in Exchange for Development Programmes’ 
study (www.unidir.ch) has been ongoing from 2002 - 2004 and examined individual and community reactions to the 
interventions in Mali, Albania and Cambodia.  Although it identified few ‘lessons learned’ that are not now been regularly 
applied at the operational level, it does provide valuable evidence to support the requirement for a consistent evaluation 
methodology within the SALW and DDR community.  PME is but one evaluation methodology that could be considered, 
but it must be used in tandem with other methods if a balanced view of the impact of a SALW control intervention is to be 
obtained. 
31 For example any projects taking place under the auspices of a Weapons in Exchange for Development programme.
EVALUATION IN ALBANIA
A traditional qualitative evaluation approach was used 
by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) to 
evaluate the impact of the UNDP SALW Control (SALWC) 
project in Albania during 2003. This was a comprehensive 
evaluation of all factors and is useful reading to illustrate 
the degree of work necessary for a useful evaluation.
16
Performance Indicators for the Monitoring and Evaluation 
of SALW Control Programmes
 (2004-11-15)
The proposed Performance Indicators could provide the primary stakeholders and the donor community with 
an ongoing estimate of the success of a SALW control intervention.  It will give them visibility and allow them 
an opportunity to more specifically target funding.  The management team would have access to quantitative 
evidence as to the progress of their programme, thereby assisting their management decision-making process.
It is not proposed that SALW control programmes should be compared against one another using these PIs. 
There are so many influencing variables that such a comparative approach would be invalid in terms of comparing 
success and learning lessons.  These proposed PIs are only meant to be used as an indicative quantitative tool for 
measuring success.  It must be remembered that they do not take into account the intent of the population who 
possess weapons, the political situation or the overall economic situation.  They are only indicators and should 
not be used as the definitive tool for the measurement of success; qualitative judgement is also important.
In terms of programme evaluation, it is highly desirable that a consistent approach should be adopted, based 
on objective, quantifiable analysis, to enable the best possible use of lessons learned for adoption in the 
management of subsequent programmes.  However, it is important that a degree of subjective assessment 
is also retained within the evaluation methodology, as it is only this that can account for the widely differing 
scenarios in which SALW control programmes take place.
 Conclusions
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A.1 
awareness
see SALW awareness
A.2 
conflict prevention
measures taken to try and prevent violent confrontation.
A.3 
conflict reduction
strategies employed by states with the aim of diffusing tensions and building sustainable peace.
A.4 
conflict resolution
efforts designed to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and strengthen their relationships by 
building or deepening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact.
A.5 
DDR
(Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration)
a three-pronged programme of reducing or abolishing weapons of former government or opposition forces, 
shedding their excess personnel and integrating their former fighters back to normal civil life, after a period of 
(usually internal) conflict.
A.6 
evaluation
a process that attempts to determine as systematically and objectively as possible the merit or value of an 
intervention.
NOTE The word “objectively” indicates the need to achieve a balanced analysis, recognising bias 
and reconciling perspectives of different stakeholders (all those interested in, and affected by 
programmes, including beneficiaries as primary stakeholders) through use of different sources and 
methods.
NOTE Evaluation is considered to be a strategic exercise.
NOTE Definition when used in relation to programmes.  (UNICEF Policy and Programming Manual). 
A.7 
indicator
quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, 
to reflect changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a given development or 
aid factor.
A.8 
intervention
a wide variety of situations in which an actor enters into the area of another, with or without the consent of the 
other.
A.9 
lessons learned
generalisations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programmes or policies that abstract from the 
specific situations to broader circumstances.  Lessons often highlight strengths and weaknesses in preparation, 
design and implementation that affect performance, outcome and impact.
 Annex A – Glossary and Definitions
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A.10 
monitoring
in the context of SALW Control the term refers to ….. the authorised observation by qualified personnel of sites, 
activities or processes without taking responsibility for that being observed .  This is usually carried out to check 
conformity with undertakings, procedures or standard practice and often includes recording and reporting 
elements.  
A.11 
quality
degree to which a set of inherent characteristics fulfils requirements. [ISO 9000:2000]
A.12 
quality management
coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to quality. [ISO 9000:2000]
A.13 
quality control (QC)
part of quality management focused on fulfilling quality requirements. [ISO 9000:2000]
NOTE QC relates to the inspection of a finished product.  In the case of collection and destruction, the 
‘product’ is destroyed weapons. 
A.14 
quality assurance (QA)
part of quality management  focused on providing confidence that quality requirements will be met.  [ISO 
9000:2000]
NOTE The purpose of QA in SALW is to confirm that management practices and operational procedures 
for collection and destruction operations are appropriate, and will achieve the stated requirement 
in a safe, effective and efficient manner.  Internal QA will be conducted by SALW organizations 
themselves, but external inspections by an external monitor should also be conducted. 
A.15 
SALW awareness
A programme of activities undertaken with the overall goal of minimising, and where possible eliminating, 
the negative consequences of inadequate SALW Control by undertaking an appropriate combination of SALW 
advocacy, SALW risk education and media operations/public information campaigns which together work to 
change behaviours and facilitate appropriate alternative solutions over the long term.
NOTE Wherever it exists, the operational objectives of a national SALW Control initiative will dictate the 
appropriate type of SALW Awareness activities.
NOTE SALW awareness is a mass mobilisation approach that delivers information on the SALW threat.    It 
may take the form of formal or non-formal education and may use mass media techniques.
NOTE In an emergency situation, due to time constraints and the lack of available data, it is the most 
practical means of communicating safety information.  In other situations it can support community 
liaison.
A.16 
SALW control
those activities, which, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled 
SALW proliferation and possession.  
A.17 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do 
not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability.
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A.18 
survey (SALW Survey)
a systematic and logical process to determine the nature and extent of SALW proliferation and impact within a 
region, nation or community in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient 
intervention by an appropriate organisation.
A.19 
verification
confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled.  [ISO 
9000:2000]
A.20 
violence
the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against 
a group or community that either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, psychological 
harm, mal-development or deprivation.  [WHO, 2003].
A.21 
weapon
any thing used, designed or used or intended for use:32
a) in causing death or injury to any person; or
b) for the purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and without restricting the generality of the 
foregoing, includes a firearm.
32 Criminal Code of Canada (CCofC) Section (S) 2 “Interpretation” Paragraph 2.
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